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INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, Americans' access to communications
technology has grown significantly.1 The number of U.S. homes with
computers grew from about 36 percent in October of 1997 to over 61
percent in October of 2003.2 A more recent report concludes that 68
percent of all Americans own a desktop computer, while 30 percent
own a laptop.3 Meanwhile, U.S. households with Internet access
grew from under 45 percent in 2000 to over 60 percent in early
2007.4 The use of high-speed and broadband connections similarly
increased, growing from 5 percent in 2000 to over 45 percent in
early 2007. The growth of Internet access has led to corresponding
growth in Internet use: tens of millions of Americans now use the
Internet for everything from communicating through e-mail and
instant messaging6 to shopping and conducting bank transactions.7
Although the advent of the Internet has allowed for the many
benefits of increased and eased communication, the Internet has
also facilitated additional criminal activities.' Aside from providing
a new avenue for confidence men and snake oil peddlers,9 the
1. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: ENTERING THE BROADBAND
AGE (2004), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol/NationOnlineBroadbandO4.pdf.
2. Id. at 4-5.
3. JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, A TYPOLOGY OF
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY USERS 2 (May 7, 2007),
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPICTITypology.pdf.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 5.
6. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at
11-13 (Oct. 2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p23-208.pdf (noting the growth of e-
mail use among adults from 12 percent in 1997 to over 50 percent in 2003).
7. Id. at 13 (finding that over 17 percent of people used the Internet for banking purposes
in 2003, whereas almost 5 percent of the U.S. population used the Internet to trade stocks).
8. For a general discussion ofvarious aspects of sexual crimes and the Internet, see PAUL
BoCiJ, CYBERSTALKING: HARASSMENT IN THE INTERNET AGE AND How To PROTECT YOUR
FAMILY (2004); DOT.CONS: CRIME, DEVIANCE, AND IDENTITY ON THE INTERNET (Yvonne Jewkes
ed., 2003); Christa M. Book, Comment, Do You Really Know Who Is on the Other Side of Your
Computer Screen? Stopping Internet Crimes Against Children, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 749
(2004).
9. See, e.g., Andrew Leckey, Fraud Dresses Up on Web, but It's Still Crime, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 2, 2006, at C6 (discussing, among other web nuisances, Nigerian fraud scams that
feature pleas for advance payment from the e-mail recipient in return for part of a vast
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Internet has created new spawning grounds for prostitution,"° child
exploitation, and child pornography." The interplay of these two
developments-the great benefits to society and the great benefits
to criminals-has created a split among American courts over
how to deal with access to the Internet for sexual offenders after
their release from the correctional system. 2 In an effort to promote
rehabilitation, federal law requires a sentence of supervised
release following imprisonment for certain crimes." As part of
that sentence, the courts may impose various conditions on
offenders, some mandatory-such as a prohibition on the use of
controlled substances-and others discretionary. 4 The court may
impose discretionary conditions as it sees fit, subject to certain
restrictions. 5 Peddlers and users of child pornography often receive
such discretionary conditions that restrict their access to the
Internet or to computers in general.'6
This Note examines how the circuit courts of appeals have
approached the issue of Internet restrictions for sexual offenders on
supervised release, both the courts that have upheld them and the
courts that have vacated them. This Note argues that the approach
utilized by the Second Circuit most effectively addresses the
primary goal of supervised release: rehabilitation of the offender.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the pragmatic
middle ground in its approach to the question of restrictions on
sexual offenders' use of computers and the Internet. This approach
allows lower courts and probationary officers to harness technologi-
fortune). See generally Miriam R. Albert, E-Buyer Beware: Why Online Auction Fraud Should
Be Regulated, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 575 (2002).
10. See Keith Sharp & Sarah Earle, Cyberpunters and Cyberwhores: Prostitution on the
Internet, in DOT.CONS, supra note 8, at 36, 36-41.
11. See Yvonne Jewkes, Policing the Net: Crime, Regulation and Surveillance in
Cyberspace, in DOT.CONS, supra note 8, at 15, 21-22.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing
circuit split); see also infra Part IV.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2006). For additional detail on the requirements of supervised
release, see infra Part II.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2006).
15. See Harold Baer, Jr., The Alpha and Omega of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REV.
267, 270 (1996) (providing an excellent overview of the details of the supervised release
statute).
16. See infra Part IV.
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cal advances for effective and reasonable monitoring of sexual
offenders' computer use. Like negotiating between the mythological
perils Scylla and Charybdis, 7 this type of monitoring avoids the
opposing extremes: the Scylla of prohibiting computer and Internet
use altogether-a truly draconian restriction given the significance
of the computer in everyday life-and the Charybdis of not placing
any restrictions on the use of the Internet or computers by sexual
offenders. This Note argues that, by negotiating between these two
extremes, the Second Circuit most effectively advances the purpose
of supervised release as pronounced by Congress.
I. THE ROLE OF THE COMPUTER AND THE INTERNET IN
MODERN LIFE
The ubiquity of computer and Internet access in America today
has transformed the computer's role in Americans' lives. Once
considered a luxury or even a device only practical for business
use,"8 the computer and the Internet now enjoy widespread use
among all segments of society. 9 The courts have recognized this
phenomenon in their discussions of supervised release.2 ° Although
17. Scylla and Charybdis were two terrors of Greek mythology, situated on opposing sides
of a narrow strait near Sicily. Sailors had to navigate between the sheer rockface of Scylla and
the whirlpool of Charybdis in order to safely make their journey. See EDITH HAMILTON,
MYTHOLOGY 174, 310 (1942). While attempting to steer clear of one, sailors would run the risk
of coming too close to the other. Jason and the Argonauts, as well as Odysseus, faced this
danger during their travels in the Mediterranean. Id.; see also Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie
Manning Magid, A Hobson's Choice Model for Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467,
470 n.10 (2006).
18. As Ken Olsen, president of Digital Equipment Corporation, said in 1977: 'There is no
reason for any individual to have a computer in their home." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S
QUOTATIONARY 134 (Leonard Roy Frank ed., 2001).
19. See, e.g., JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, HOME
BROADBAND ADOPTION 2006, at 3 (2006), http://www.pewinternet.orgtpdfs/PIP_Broadband-
trends 2006.pdf (showing over one-third growth of home broadband connections to the
Internet between 2005 and 2006); see also Bruce Lambert, Suffolk County Plans To Offer Free
Wireless Internet Access, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at B1 (discussing city's plan to offer free
wireless Internet access to its residents).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (referring to the
Internet as an "important medium of communication, commerce, and information-gathering");
United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Internet is "an
important resource for information, communication, commerce, and other legitimate uses');
United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (commenting that the Internet and
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these statements reveal a widespread belief in the growth of the
Internet, the full extent of the Internet's impact is often difficult to
discern without an examination of some of the available statistics
and trends.
Recent surveys have indicated that Internet usage among
American consumers has reached an all-time high, with over 70
percent of respondents reportedly using the Internet on a regular
basis.2' Those who used the Internet stated that it improved their
overall satisfaction with many daily activities, including shopping,
pursuing hobbies or other recreation, job searching, and finding
health information.22 Additionally, the more often and the longer
individuals used the Internet, the greater the benefit they tended to
perceive."
Perhaps the most striking way in which the Internet has affected
American daily life is how both state and federal governments have
embraced the technology and used it to share information and allow
more efficient access to government services.24 American citizens
can now file and pay income taxes online,25 research available
federal job openings,2" and review current legislation or the up-
coming legislative calendar.27 Federal courts have posted argument
schedules, bench memoranda, and opinions online.28 With these
sources available today, an average American with an Internet
e-mail are "an increasingly wide[ly] used form of communication").
21. See MARYMADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, DATA MEMO-INTERNET
PENETRATION AND IMPACT 3 (Apr. 2006), http://www.pewinternet.orgtpdfs/PIPInternet
_Impact.pdf [hereinafter MADDEN, INTERNET PENETRATION] (based on studies conducted in
February through April, 2006).
22. Id. at 1-2.
23. Id. at 2.
24. See, e.g., Akira Tsuchiya, 'he Politics of Information"[ Toward Effective eGovernment
Implementation: Examining Characteristics of U.S. Internet Users, 10 GEO. PUB. POLy REV.
41 (2004) (providing an overview of government use of the Internet's capabilities).
25. See Internal Revenue Service, IRS e-file for Individual Taxpayers, http://www.irs.gov/
efile/article/0,,id=118508,00.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
26. See USAJOBS, http://www.usajobs.gov (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (billing itself as the
Federal Government's official "one-stop source for Federal jobs").
27. See THOMAS, http://www.thomas.gov (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (U.S. government
website maintained by the Library of Congress).
28. See, e.g., United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Opinions, Decisions,
& Orders, http://www.fedcir.gov/dailylog.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
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connection has access to more government information than at any
point in the past.29
As this brief discussion has shown, computers and the Internet
play an integral role in the lives of most Americans today. The
Internet supports communication, research, job-seeking, and ac-
cess to government information; together, these activities form
part of the social network a sexual offender must reenter.3 ° Cutting
released offenders off from access to that social network and its
benefits would necessarily run against the basic reasoning behind
supervised release enunciated by Congress-that of rehabilitation
and successful reentry into society.3'
II. THE GOALS AND RATIONALE OF SUPERVISED RELEASE
The use of supervised release as a penological tool began with the
passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.32 Akin to probation
in many respects, supervised release is nevertheless a different
creature.33 Unlike probation, which a court cannot give if it orders
a term of imprisonment, supervised release "is a form of government
supervision after a term of imprisonment."34 At the time of its
passage, Congress viewed supervised release as "a separate part of
the defendant's sentence, rather than being the end of the term of
imprisonment., 35 The release period begins the day the offender
leaves prison and lasts as long as the court deems necessary.36 If an
29. See John C. Reitz, E-Government, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 733, 733 (2006) ("With just a few
mouseclicks, one can find a link to just about any unit of government at any level.").
30. See, e.g., Web Community Can Widen Social Network, Study Says, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28,
2006, at C4 (discussing how use of the Internet increases social contacts in addition to
providing information).
31. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 125 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3308.
32. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673
(2006)); see also Baer, supra note 15.
33. See Baer, supra note 15, at 269-70.
34. Id. at 269.
35. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 123 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3306.
36. Baer, supra note 15, at 270. An officer from the U.S. Probation Office will supervise
the offender to ensure that the offender abides by the conditions laid out by the sentencing
court. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(f) (2006) (stating that "the probation officer [will] provide the
defendant with a written statement that sets forth all the conditions ... of supervised
release").
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offender violates the conditions of supervised release, the sentencing
court, at its discretion, may return the offender to prison.37
When determining the appropriate length of supervised release,
the courts must look at many of the same factors as they would
when giving a sentence of imprisonment.3" For the mandatory
conditions, the court must order domestic violence convicts to attend
certain rehabilitative programs, and the law requires the court to
order certain sex offenders to register pursuant to the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act.3" Offenders on supervised release
must also abstain from use of controlled substances and undergo
drug tests.4 °
For the discretionary conditions, the statute allows the court to
order conditions of supervised release to the extent that they: (1) are
"reasonably related" to the sentencing provisions of 18 U.S.C §
3553,41 (2) involve "no greater deprivation of liberty than is reason-
ably necessary" for purposes of § 3553,42 and (3) are consistent with
the relevant policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.43 The
factors listed under § 3553 include the need for the restrictions to
accommodate the character of the offense and of the offender, to
deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public from any
additional crimes by the defendant, 4 and to provide the defendant
37. § 3583(e).
38. § 3583(c) (citing several sections of § 3553(a)). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) lays out both
mandatory and discretionary supervised release conditions.
39. § 3583(d) (referring to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. No.
109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006)). The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act requires
that the offender provide, among other things: his name, address of residence, social security
number, name and address of employment, and license plate number and vehicle description.
See Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act § 114(a).
40. § 3583(d) (stating that such requirement may be waived by the court pursuant to §
3563).
41. § 3583(d)(1); see § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D).
42. § 3583(d)(2).
43. § 3583(d)(3).
44. Contrary to the popular view, however, the criminal justice and social science
literature appears mixed on whether any recidivism disparity exists between sexual offenders
and other types of criminals. As one researcher said about the controversy, 'heat too often
prevails over light." TERENCE W. CAMPBELL, ASSESSING SEX OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND
PITFALLS 4 (2004). Studies of recidivism rates often produce contradictory results. See, e.g.,
Lisa Munoz, California School Under Fire over Volunteer's Sex Record, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2007, at A15 (quoting proponents on both sides of the debate). For the pro-disparity view, see,
2007] 687
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
with needed training or medical and correctional treatment.45 The
text of § 3583 also implies that any discretionary conditions imposed
by the sentencing judge should meet both the needs of the
offender-represented by the provisions of § 3553(a)(2)(D) and the
instructions of § 3583 requiring conditions "reasonably related" to
the minimization of any deprivation of the offender's liberty-and
the interests of the government.46
The principal goal of supervised release appears in the legislative
history of the Sentencing Reform Act. In a 1983 Senate Judiciary
Committee Report, the Committee noted that:
The sentencing purposes of incapacitation and punishment
would not be served by a term of supervised release ...; the
primary goal of such a term is to ease the defendant's transition
into the community after the service of a long prison term for a
particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a
defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison ... but
still needs supervision and training programs after release.47
The courts have applied these goals in an effort to ensure that the
conditions of supervised release have a meaningful bearing on the
crime committed and that the conditions serve to help the offender
reenter society. The circuit courts of appeals have also allowed
restrictions on the use of alcohol or other intoxicants,48 driving,4 s
for example, Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 374 n.1 (N.J. 1995) (noting higher relative recidivism
rates for sex offenders); Daniel L. Feldman, The "Scarlet Letter Laws"of the 1990s: A Response
to Critics, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1105 n.131 (1997) (citing a California study finding recidivism
rates for sexual offenders six times higher than that of other criminals). For the anti-disparity
view, see David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, Other Crimes Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78
MINN. L. REV. 529, 572-73 (1994) (stating that "no study has demonstrated that sex offenders
have a consistently higher or lower recidivism rate than other major offenders"); Carol L.
Kunz, Comment, Toward Effective Control of Sexual Offenders, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 473-75
(1997) (discussing reasons for belief in greater recidivism for sexual offenders).
45. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(a)(2)(D).
46. § 3583(d)(3) (citing § 3553(a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C)).
47. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 125 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 235 F.3d 2, 5-7 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding a
restriction preventing alcohol consumption because the record reflected a relationship
between the defendant's acts and his alcohol use).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 837-38 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that
the driving restriction was related to the defendant's prior history of violence and dangerous
688 [Vol. 49:681
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and the incurrence of debt.5" Although broad, the above factors "do
impose a real restriction on the district court's freedom to impose
conditions on supervised release.""1 At other times, the appeals
courts have found conditions of supervised release too broad or
unsupported, overruling conditions restricting possession of any
(legal or illegal) pornography,52 linking supervised release to
deportation, 3 and lacking proper factual findings.54 Over the past
several years, the federal circuit courts have taken different
approaches to the question of supervised release and the sexual
offender,55 especially concerning the issue of the offender's access to
the Internet and other computer technology.
III. THE INTERNET AND THE SEX OFFENDER
The Internet allows users to create new identities and engage in
new and different modes of expression and presentation.5' Criminals
on the Internet use this anonymity to commit a wide variety of
crimes, from the mundane and relatively harmless 7 to the
alcohol use).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1046 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding debt
restriction when linked to defendant's obligation to pay over $5.7 million in restitution).
51. United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding no reasonable
relation between requirement of mental health treatment and defendant who illegally
purchased a weapon).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding the
condition to be unconstitutionally vague and potentially infringing on First Amendment
rights).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 923 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 1991) (disallowing
condition of release that would result in deportation without hearing).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Zanghi, 209 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
condition of home confinement because the district court failed to explain its reasoning).
55. See infra Part IV.
56. See Yvonne Jewkes & Keith Sharp, Crime Deviance and the Disembodied Self-
Transcending the Dangers of Corporeality, in DOT.CONS, supra note 8, at 1-4. See generally Jay
Krasovec, Comment, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, for Regulation?, 31 AKRON L. REV. 101
(1997) (discussing methods by which users may remain anonymous on the Internet).
57. The Internet remains a bastion of intellectual property infringement, especially in the
areas of music and video entertainment. See, e.g., James M. Sellers, Comment, The Black
Market and Intellectual Property: A Potential Sherman Act Section Two Antitrust Defense?,
14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 583 (2004).
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exploitive and dangerous.5" The ease of communication-through e-
mail, discussion boards, or chatrooms-allows those engaging in
potentially criminal or deviant behavior to meet others with the
same interests. 59 These new identities aid the goals of the sexual
offender and hinder the investigative tools of police: anonymous
figures on the Internet and in cyberspace are difficult to track down
and attach to a physical person at a physical address.6 ° Distributors
of child pornography and other illegal material can mask their
identities from each other and from law enforcement with the use
of passwords and encrypted data.6 The dangers of the Internet's
anonymity, however, often go beyond the mere transmittal of
harmful images and into the area of physical abuse and exploita-
tion.62
Child sexual abuse allegations are prevalent on our televisions
and in our newspapers.63 The plotline of each story follows the same
58. The Internet has assisted in the various sexual offenses discussed in this Note, as well
as in potentially more dangerous terrorist activity. See, e.g., Seth R. Merl, Note, Internet
Communication Standards for the 21st Century: International Terrorism Must Force the U.S.
To Adopt "Carnivore"and New Electronic Surveillance Standards, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 245
(2001).
59. See BOCIJ, supra note 8, at 105 (discussing Bocij's research on how the Internet has
allowed pedophiles to work together online, "encourag[ing] each other and shar[ing]
resources"); see also United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
defendant conversed with and encouraged other sexual offenders on the Internet prior to
committing his crimes).
60. See Meiring de Villiers, Free Radicals in Cyberspace: Complex Liability Issues in
Information Warfare, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 13, 39 (2005) (noting that the degree of
anonymity on the Internet "embolden[s] cybercriminals to commit crimes they would
otherwise not consider").
61. See Kelly M. Doherty, Comment, www.obscenity.com: An Analysis of Obscenity and
Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 AKRON L. REv. 259,263-64 (1999). For a recent article
discussing the breadth of child pornography on the Internet and the efforts by law
enforcement to stop it, see Candace Rondeaux, Va. Officer Key in Hunt for Nation's
Pedophiles, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at Cl.
62. See Robyn Forman Pollack, Comment, Creating the Standards of a Global Community:
Regulating Pornography on the Internet-An International Concern, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 467, 478-80 (1996) (discussing several cases in which sex offenders used the Internet to
select their rape or kidnap victims).
63. Id. (describing several cases that follow this pattern); see also Charles Babington &
Dan Balz, Foley Lawyer Cites Alcohol, Childhood Abuse;Attorney Says Lawmaker Never Tried
To Have Sex with a Minor, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2006, at Al (discussing recent scandal
involving former Rep. Mark Foley of Florida, who engaged in sexually explicit instant message
conversations with congressional pages).
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path: a child or young teenager participates in an online chat room,
discussion board, or e-mail conversation wherein he or she makes
virtual acquaintance with an offender who has assumed the identity
of a similarly aged child. The child and offender develop their
"friendship" and eventually the two arrange a face-to-face meeting.
At this meeting, the offender rapes or molests the child. In each of
these cases, the computer provides the initial and essential
connection between the child victim and the offender. 4
One implication of these incidents is that such crimes would most
likely not have happened had the offender not used his computer
to initiate the exchange with the child victim.65 Because sexual
offenders can find their victims anonymously and with minimal
fear of capture while operating on the Internet,66 computer access
itself allows sexual offenders to expand their potential victim pool.
When attempting to navigate through these problems presented
by sexual offenders, sentencing courts have used the supervised
release statute67 to craft release conditions that both satisfy its
rehabilitative goals and ideally prevent future wrongdoing by the
now-released offender.
Sentencing courts have frequently constructed conditions that
prevent or minimize the released offender's access to the Internet. 8
The circuit courts of appeals have taken different approaches to the
question of whether computer and Internet restrictions are permis-
sible under § 3583. The appellate courts' approaches tend to differ
regarding the level of access sexual offenders may have upon
release, varying from those that deem restrictions overly broad and
strike them down, to the courts that prohibit any Internet or
computer access. This Note will argue that the more measured
approach of the Second Circuit is the most effective.
64. See Pollack, supra note 62, at 478-80.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing how
defendant used the Internet to find other sex offenders and encourage their exploitation of
children).
66. See Doherty, supra note 61, at 263-64.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2006).
68. See infra Part IV.
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IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Supervised Release Conditions Vacated
Appellate courts have reversed supervised release conditions that
restrict Internet access in multiple jurisdictions. In 2002, the
Second Circuit vacated a supervised release restriction that banned
Internet and computer access completely.69 One year later, the Third
Circuit vacated a comparable restriction on similar grounds. °
Likewise, in 2001, the Tenth Circuit found such broad prohibitions
on computer and Internet use impermissible.7 As this Note shows,
these courts have charted a path leading them close to Charybdis
and the dangers of completely unregulated access to computers and
the Internet for released sexual offenders.
1. Second Circuit (Take One): No Total Ban
The Second Circuit vacated the supervised release terms of
Gregory Sofsky in March 2002.72 Sofsky pled guilty to receiving child
pornography in violation of federal law; 3 Sofsky had collected over
one thousand images of child pornography on his computer and
had also used the Internet to transmit those images to other
individuals.74 The district court sentenced Sofsky to 121 months in
prison accompanied by three years of supervised release.75 Under
his supervised release terms, Sofsky could not use a computer or the
Internet without prior approval from his probation officer.76
On appeal, the Second Circuit viewed the restriction in light of
§ 3583(d)7 and found that it "inflict[ed] a greater deprivation on
Sofsky's liberty than is reasonably necessary."" The court likened
69. United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2002).
70. United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2003).
71. United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2001).
72. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 127.
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (2006).
74. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 124.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra Part II.
78. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126.
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use of the Internet to use of the telephone: both have benign uses,
and using either one to commit a crime does not necessitate a
complete prohibition on their future use.79 The court held that
because of the importance of Internet access in today's wired society,
imposing such a "total ban" would fruitlessly deprive Sofsky of the
many legal uses of the Internet.8°
2. Third Circuit: Restrictions Must Be Focused
In January 2003, the Third Circuit vacated the district court's
sentencing order in the case of United States v. Freeman."'
Government officials arrested Freeman after he accepted images of
child pornography from an undercover agent.82 At his sentencing
hearing, 3 the district court sentenced Freeman to seventy months
in prison and five years of supervised release.84 As in So/sky, the
conditions of Freeman's supervised release prohibited him from
owning or accessing a computer with Internet capability without the
prior approval of his probation officer.85
The appellate panel found this restriction to constitute "a greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to deter future
criminal conduct and to protect the public." 6 The court also cited
So/sky87 to support its holding and relied upon very similar reading:
a total Internet ban would prevent access to harmless materials
from weather reports to simple e-mail.8 Instead, the court deter-
mined that it could use "a more focused restriction," through other
79. Id. (citing United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 82-84 (2d Cir. 2001)).
80. Id.
81. 316 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2003).
82. Id. at 387-88 (noting that Freeman was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and
§ 2252(a)(4)(B)).
83. This was his resentencing; the Third Circuit rejected Freeman's initial sentencing
order as being inconsistent with federal sentencing guidelines in place at the time. See id. at
389-90.
84. Id. at 389.
85. Id. at 389-90.
86. Id. at 392.
87. United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002).
88. See Freeman, 316 F.3d at 391-92.
2007] 693
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
means, such as surprise inspections of Freeman's computer
devices.8 9
3. Tenth Circuit: Limited Monitoring Only
In United States v. White,' the Tenth Circuit found that sweeping
bans on computer use were "neither reasoned nor reasonable."'"
Robert White responded to an online advertisement for video tapes
of young girls engaged in sexual activities with adult men.92 The
advertisement was part of a sting operation run by U.S. Customs
officers who subsequently arrested White after he took possession
of the incriminating tapes.9" White pled guilty to receiving child
pornography and received a prison term of two years followed by
three years of probation.94 White's probation conditions stated that
he could not possess any sexually explicit material or a computer
with Internet access.9"
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that such a term of White's
release was both "potentially too narrow and overly broad."96 White
could easily circumvent the restriction by using an Internet-capable
computer at a library or a cybercaf6, and, thus, the restriction was
too narrow.97 Alternatively, an interpretation that did not allow for
White to use any computer device at all was overly broad. Like the
So/sky court, the Tenth Circuit likened the Internet and the
communication it allowed to a telephone-no simple way existed to
prevent people from using it. 9" The court ultimately ruled that any
restriction on computer or Internet use by a defendant must allow
for some sort of monitoring by a probation officer. 99
89. Id. at 392.
90. 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
91. Id. at 1207.
92. Id. at 1201.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1206.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1207.
99. Id.
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These circuits have indicated a dislike for sweeping restrictions
on released offenders' access to computers and the Internet. As the
courts in So/sky and Freeman noted, such broad restraints prohibit
access to even the most harmless information, such as weather
reports or stock quotes. °0 These courts vacated the restrictions for
their lack of tailoring to the released offender, such as the "more
limited restriction" desired by the Third Circuit. 10' Not all of the
circuits, however, have such a dislike for broad restrictions.
B. Internet and Computer Restrictions Permitted by Courts
Although several circuits have disapproved of computer restric-
tions for offenders on supervised release, others, including the Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, have taken the opposite approach.
In 2001, the Fifth Circuit upheld a supervised release restriction
that prohibited the offender from possessing or using computers
because the restriction was necessary to serve the goals of the
release program.0 2 The Ninth Circuit similarly found that restric-
tions on a released offender met the release program's statutory
goals. ' In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's ban
on computer and Internet access as being consistent with the
requirements of the release statute.0 4 In seeking to avoid the
hazards of uncontrolled access of released offenders to the Internet,
these courts steer too far from the threat of Charybdis and run the
risk of colliding with Scylla instead.
1. Fifth Circuit: Internet Bans Meet Statutory Goals
In United States v. Paul,1 5 the Fifth Circuit upheld a supervised
release condition that prohibited the defendant from possessing or
accessing computers, the Internet, and various devices capable of
100. Indeed, Yahoo's website contains weather reports, stock quotes, and free e-mail. See
Yahoo!, http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
101. United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003).
102. United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169-70 (5th Cir. 2001).
103. United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620-21 (9th Cir. 2003).
104. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093-94 (11th Cir. 2003).
105. 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001).
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creating photographic or visual images." 6 Paul had pled guilty to
charges of possessing child pornography, which he had downloaded
from the Internet. °7 He received a sentence of five years imprison-
ment and three years of supervised release.'0 8
Upon later review by the appellate panel, the court focused on the
nature of the defendant's crime and how his Internet use facilitated
his criminal activities."°9 The court specifically cited to Paul's use of
the Internet to "encourage exploitation of children by seeking out
fellow [pedophiles] and providing them with advice" on how to find
potential child victims." ° Based on these actions, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the condition of release, citing its dual purpose of both
furthering public safety and preventing more criminal activity in
the future."' Additionally, the Paul court held that complete
Internet bans are not "per se an unacceptable condition of super-
vised release ... [and] that such a supervised release condition can
be acceptable if it is reasonably necessary to serve the statutory
goals outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). ' '12
2. Ninth Circuit: Limitations Do Not Deprive Liberty
In United States v. Rearden,"' the defendant appealed the terms
of his supervised release prohibiting him from using a computer
with Internet access at any location without his probation officer's
approval." 4 A bench trial convicted Rearden of shipping child
pornography across state lines and sentenced him to fifty-one
months in prison with a period of supervised release to follow."'
When examining this specific provision of his release, the Ninth
Circuit looked at other circuits' decisions in similar cases"' and held
106. Id. at 160.
107. Id. at 158.
108. Id. at 159.
109. Id. at 169.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 169.
112. Id. at 169-70.
113. 349 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 2003).
114. Id. at 620.
115. Id. at 612.
116. Id. at 620-21.
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that limiting access to the Internet met the statutory requirements
of § 3583 without creating the dangers of unnecessarily depriving
the defendant of his liberty. 117 Similar to Paul, the Ninth Circuit
took no issue with limiting released offenders' access to the Internet.
3. Eleventh Circuit: Computer Use Prohibited
As a result of a government sting operation, Karl Zinn pled guilty
to possessing materials that contained child pornography images." 8
The district court sentenced Zinn to thirty-three months in prison
and three years of supervised release. 1 9 One condition of his release
was that Zinn could not own or use a computer with Internet access
unless he had prior approval from his probation officer. 2° The
Eleventh Circuit's review of this condition was one of first impres-
sion. 2'
When evaluating this question, the Eleventh Circuit focused on
the "strong link between child pornography and the Internet."'22
Although recognizing the importance of the Internet in today's
society, the court found the benefits of the restriction to both the
public and Zinn met the statutory requirements of § 3583.123 While
noting the contrary rulings of the Sofsky and Freeman courts, the
Eleventh Circuit stated that Internet restrictions such as those
required for Zinn represent "a necessary and reasonable condition
of supervised release."'24 Like the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the
Eleventh Circuit held that restrictions on computer access and
Internet use-even stringent ones-fit within the statutory
framework of the supervised release program.
117. Id.
118. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1086 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that Zinn was
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1087.
121. Id. at 1092.
122. Id. at 1092-93 (citing United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001)).
123. Id. at 1093-94 (noting that the Internet is an "important resource for information,
communication, commerce, and other legitimate uses ... [but that] the need exists to protect
both the public and sex offenders themselves').
124. Id. at 1093.
2007] 697
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
In contrast to the approach taken by the Second Circuit in So[sky
and by the Third and Tenth Circuits, the Paul, Rearden, and Zinn
courts took the view that broad Internet and computer restrictions
are permissible for released sexual offenders. In weighing the
statutory factors, these courts in effect determined that the safety
needs of the public surpass the need of the released offender to
transition back into a normal life within the community and begin
reintegration into society. While recognizing these different views
of treating sexual offenders, the approach taken by the Second
Circuit aims to allow the released offender to participate in society
and enjoy the benefits of the Internet and at the same time make
sure that his actions do not endanger the public.
C. The Second Circuit Approach: Using Technology To Avoid
Scylla and Charybdis
The Second Circuit has recently taken a more measured approach
to the question of Internet restrictions on sexual offenders by
examining the role of technological solutions to the problem. In
cases such as United States v. Lifshitz'25 and United States v.
Balon,126 the court focused explicitly on the technology available and
how it might serve to best help the offender reenter society. This
approach recognizes that courts can use technology to allow
offenders on supervised release to use the Internet while still
remaining under some correctional supervision. Such an approach
best encapsulates the goals of the supervised release program
-more so than the approaches taken by the other circuits.
1. United States v. Lifshitz: Analyzing Technological Solutions
Government agents arrested Brandon Lifshitz after investigating
his home computer and finding pornographic images of children. 127
125. 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit also hinted at this approach in its
analysis of supervised release in United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2002)
(discussing the possibility of performing unannounced searches on Sofsky's computer or an
online sting operation to entice Sofsky to respond to an ad for pornography).
126. 384 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2004).
127. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 175.
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Lifshitz pled guilty to one count of receiving such illegal images. 28
At sentencing, Lifshitz requested a noncustodial sentence from the
court because of his diagnoses from several doctors that he suffered
from a variety of mental illnesses, including depression, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and schizoid personality disorder.'29 Upon
review of this material, the court released Lifshitz to his grand-
mother's care and sentenced him to three years of supervised
release. 3 ° During this time, the court ordered that Lifshitz "shall
consent to the installation of systems that will enable the Probation
office ... to monitor and filter computer use on a regular or random
basis and any computer owned or controlled by [Lifshitz]."'1'
In its analysis of this restriction,3 2 the Second Circuit addressed
three main issues in the context of monitoring Lifshitz's computer
use: 1) the government's interest in the particular probation
restriction; 2) the expectation of privacy of the offender; and 3) the
"scope and efficacy" of the condition.' The court's analysis of these
factors closely parallels the analysis required under § 3583(d)' for
determining the validity of the conditions of supervised release.
As mentioned by Congress in the legislative history of the
supervised release program, 38 the government's main interest lies
in the area of rehabilitation.'36 In Lifshitz's case, the court held that
limitations and monitoring of Lifshitz's computer use would
enhance the rehabilitative goals of the state.'37 The Second Circuit
128. Id. at 176. Prosecutors charged Lifshitz under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). Id. at 175.
129. Id. at 176.
130. Id. at 176-77.
131. Id. at 177.
132. The court in Lifshitz spent some time discussing the nature of probationary
restrictions and how they fit into the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on searches without warrants or probable cause. See id. at 178-88. This area is not
a focus of this Note, and, therefore, it is mentioned only as required for a full analysis of the
issue discussed here.
133. Id. at 190.
134. See supra Part II.
135. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (' These restrictions are meant
to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the
community is not harmed by the probationer's being at large.").
137. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 189-90. At sentencing, U.S. District Judge Patterson stated that
he did not feel that imprisonment would further Lifshitz's mental disorder treatment. Id. at
177.
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also implicitly considered the welfare of the public as part of these
goals.
As for the issue of Lifshitz's expectation of privacy, the Second
Circuit recognized that any monitoring regime would endanger and
restrict that privacy.138 Intrusions into one's home are generally
looked upon with disfavor, but the court accorded less privacy to the
communications Lifshitz made electronically with the outside
world.3 9 The court summarized its analysis by noting that, "While
the extent to which a probationer's privacy interests are implicated
depends on the type of monitoring implemented ... they are, in any
event, reduced by the very fact that he remains subject to federal
probation."'4 °
The court then addressed the third and final factor in its analysis:
the "[s]cope and [e]fficacy of the [supervised release] [c]ondition."''
The court held that any monitoring program must be "narrowly
tailored, and not sweep so broadly as to draw a wide swath of
extraneous material into its net."'42 Comparing computer monitor-
ing to prior cases on drug testing, the court emphasized the
importance of a monitoring regime's exact targeting and the
necessity of disregarding collected information that falls outside of
that exacting range. 4 ' With this standard, the court then proceeded
to survey various types of computer monitoring software and
equipment available at the time.'44 The willingness to examine what
software was available indicates the Second Circuit's move from an
anti-Internet restriction stance in Sofsky'45 to a willingness to
embrace technological solutions to the problems facing both the
government and the offenders. This embrace of technology most
138. Id. at 190.
139. Id. (citing examples of courts holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their home computers; also citing Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that Internet users would have a diminished expectation of privacy in their electronic
communications)).
140. Id. (citing United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 457 (2d Cir. 2002)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 190-93.
145. United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002).
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effectively allows the supervised release program to meet its
rehabilitative goals.
2. United States v. Balon: Efficiency of Technological Solution
Is Vital
In Balon,'46 the Second Circuit again decided a case questioning
the use of computer monitoring as a condition of a sexual offender's
supervised release. Unlike Lifshitz, however, the Balon court
explicitly reviewed the statutory factors laid out in § 3553 and §
3583(d) when examining Stephen Balon's sentencing restrictions.'47
Balon's conditions of release included providing advance notice to
the probation office of his use of computers or computer services, as
well as allowing the government to install software applications on
and randomly monitor his computer. 4 ' Balon received this sentence
after pleading guilty to one count of transmitting child pornography
by means of a computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1).'49
On review, the Second Circuit focused the bulk of its analysis on
the remote monitoring condition and its implications for Balon's
expectation of privacy."50 Following Lifshitz, the Balon court held
that offenders on supervised release must endure a "diminished
expectation of privacy that is inherent in the very term 'supervised
release.""' Given that the government may employ such techniques
to monitor Balon without harming his-very limited-expectation
of privacy, the court turned its attention to the efficacy of the
monitoring program as a way of measuring the deprivation of liberty
that such a condition would entail.'52 Following the lead of the
Lifshitz court, the Balon court held that such an analysis "is
governed by technological considerations."'5 3 With those consider-
ations in mind, the Second Circuit dismissed Balon's appeal on the
issue of remote monitoring for lack of ripeness and ordered that the
146. United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2004).
147. Id. at 42.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 41.
150. Id. at 43-46.
151. Id. at 44 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 457 (2d Cir. 2002)).
152. Id. at 45.
153. Id. at 46.
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district court review the conditions of supervised release at a time
closer to Balon's entry into the supervised release program." Thus,
after following the general approach of Lifshitz, the Balon court took
the further step of requiring examination of the effectiveness and
precision of technological solutions, recognizing that even the
potential advantages of such programs must be weighed against any
likely downsides.
D. The Middle Ground of the Second Circuit
As this review of cases examining the question of supervised
release for sexual offenders indicates, the opinions of the Second
Circuit in both Lifshitz and Balon represent a middle ground
between the all-or-nothing extremes espoused by other circuits. 5'
The earlier Second Circuit decision of Sofsky, as well as the
decisions from the Third and Tenth Circuits, exhibit a tendency
towards permissive supervised release with little if any limitation
on Internet and computer usage.' The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits, conversely, permit much more restrictive conditions that
control released sexual offenders' access to the Internet and
computers.
157
Lifshitz and Balon indicate a movement towards a compromise
between the extremes of little restriction on released sexual
offenders' computer usage and total restriction. This middle ground
allows released sexual offenders to access the computer and use the
Internet, but with the safeguard of monitoring such usage using the
technological tools currently available.'58 The Second Circuit's
middle ground approach offers a pragmatic solution to supervised
release that most efficiently meets the program's goals and pur-
poses.
154. Id. at 47.
155. In fact, consider the Second Circuit itself in Sofsky. See supra Part IV.A.1.
156. See supra Part IV.A.
157. See supra Part IV.B.
158. See United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190-93 (2d Cir. 2004); Balon, 384 F.3d at
45.
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V. THE PRAGMATISM OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Although briefly discussed in decisions from other courts,159 the
Second Circuit has taken the lead in examining technology's impact
on the future of Internet and computer restrictions. By embracing
the power of computer filtering and monitoring technology, the
Second Circuit has laid the groundwork for restrictions that sail
between the Scylla of absolute prohibitions and Charybdis of
unfettered access by sexual offenders. This approach better serves
the primary goal of supervised release as discussed in the
Sentencing Reform Act's legislative history: the rehabilitation of the
released offender.16°
As the Sentencing Reform Act's legislative history indicates,
Congress viewed offender rehabilitation as the primary goal of
supervised release. 161 Supervised release would not act as a form of
"punishment or incapacitation since those purposes will have been
served ... by the term of imprisonment.' 62 Indeed, as commentators
have noted, the ultimate purpose of supervised release is its
eventual end and the offender's return to society without any
governmental supervision or controls whatsoever.'63 The goals and
objectives of supervised release imply that the value of a release
program as a rehabilitative tool mirrors the extent to which the
conditions of supervised release simulate life after the program's
end. Following such reasoning, unduly harsh conditions would not
facilitate an offender's transition back into the everyday life of the
community, but would more likely serve as a continuation of prison,
or perhaps prison-lite. Because of the importance of the computer
and the Internet in daily life in the United States, as explained
159. See, e.g., United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that "[the
court is] confident that the district court can impose a more narrowly-tailored restriction ...
on computer use through a prohibition on accessing certain categories of websites and
Internet content").
160. See supra Part II (discussing the primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act and
supervised release).
161. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 124 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307.
162. See id. at 125, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3308.
163. See Edward R. Becker, Guideline Amendments, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 238, 241
(1990).
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below, extensive prohibitions on the use of either represents a
significant barrier to a full reentry into society.1 4 Compared to the
all-or-nothing approaches taken by other courts, 165 the Second
Circuit's pragmatic approach allows the sexual offender on super-
vised release to participate in an ever-growing and ever-prevalent
aspect of American life.
The wide variety of ways in which Americans today use the
Internet demonstrates how integral it is to everyday life. The
decision to uphold severe supervised release restrictions on Internet
usage by sexual offenders in cases such as United States v. Paul,'66
however, prohibits those offenders from participating in this ever-
more important aspect of American society. This outcome directly
contradicts the primary goal of supervised release-rehabilitation.'67
As commentators have noted, knowledge and use of computer skills
is of great importance for those attempting to reenter society after
a term of imprisonment.6 8' This argument is a logical extension of
the reasoning behind the many prison industry programs in place
today: "meaningful, realistic prison industry programs can equip ...
prisoners with productive works habits and skills.'1 69 Not unlike the
prisoners participating in prison work programs, sex offenders on
supervised release, while still under the watch of probation officers
and the courts, are attempting to fit into society as law-abiding
citizens. Having access to the Internet and being able to participate
in the many benefits it provides-from looking for jobs to being able
164. Internet restrictions appear to arise from the public's concern over the allegedly higher
recidivism rates of sexual offenders. See, e.g., The Toxic Offender, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007,
at L114 (noting "the widespread public perception that sex offenders pose a unique threat that
deserves special attention from law enforcement"). It is unclear, however, if such a higher
recidivism rate exists. See supra note 44.
165. See supra Parts IV.A-B (discussing United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir.
2001) (vacating restrictions on Internet use) and United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir.
2001) (upholding ban on Internet and computer use)).
166. 274 F.3d 155.
167. See supra Part II.
168. See Karen J. Hartman, Prison Walls and Firewalls: H.B. 2376-Arizona Denies
Inmates Access to the Internet, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1423, 1434-35 (2000) (discussing how Internet
access would help prepare prison inmates for the transition back into the community).
169. Sharon Goodman, Note, Prisoners and Entrepreneurs: Developing a Model for
Prisoner-Run Industry, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1163, 1164 (1982) (also noting that successful prison
work programs minimize prisoner recidivism).
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to research and educate themselves online171°-allows offenders on
supervised release to be involved in the world around them. The
Second Circuit's approach to supervised release takes these benefits
into account.
As discussed above, instead of prohibiting Internet use altogether,
the Second Circuit considers the technology available and how it
will impact the sexual offender's ability to access non-prohibited
information compared to restricted material.1 71 In Lifshitz, the court
even took the time to review the available technology to determine
how the available monitoring programs worked and what effect
those programs would have on the offender. 172 Ultimately, the
Lifshitz court held that the district court should review the available
monitoring programs' privacy and efficacy implications and fashion
a supervised release condition consistent with the Second Circuit's
view that "the monitoring condition must be narrowly-tailored, and
not sweep so broadly as to draw a wide swath of extraneous
material into its net.' 73
Software programs available today may meet this requirement. 1
74
Potential software programs are divided into two categories:
filtering and monitoring.175 Filtering technology allows the proba-
tion officer to limit the material the offender sees on the Internet or
receives through e-mail, whereas monitoring technology allows a
probation officer to track the offender's Internet usage.176 In the case
of sexual offenders, the filtering software could disable access to
certain sites that may be linked to child pornography or meet
criteria indicative of a site related to such illegal activities.177 The
monitoring programs can record all of a user's activities while on the
170. See Hartman, supra note 168, at 1434-35 (referring to the Internet as a "powerful
educational tool").
171. See United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190-93 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing how the
court looks at the "[s]cope and [elfficacy of the [supervised release] [c]ondition").
172. Id.
173. Id. at 190.
174. See Dane C. Miller et al., Conditions of Supervision that Limit an Offender's Access to
Computers and Internet Services: Recent Cases and Emerging Technology, 42 CRIM. L. BULL.
3 (July-Aug. 2006).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. For example, Spector Pro 5.0 can block access to specific websites or instant
messaging altogether as well as monitor computer usage. Id.
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computer-not just his Internet usage-and log it by time and
activity for later review by probation officials.'78 These programs,
which are constantly changing and updating to better utilize the
available technology and meet customer demand, 7 ' provide the
sentencing court and probation officials with options regarding how
extensively to monitor, what to monitor, and how much access to
legal and non-prohibited material the offender should receive.80
With such monitoring capabilities in place, the Second Circuit's
approach to supervised release allows the sexual offender to use the
Internet and in effect allows the offender to be one step closer to a
full transition back into society.' 8 ' Such a program could allow
sexual offenders access to the mundane activities of the Internet,
such as reading the news, looking up reference information, and
checking the weather. Additionally, a monitoring program would
allow more substantive Internet activities, such as online shopping,
e-mail (for both personal and business use), and job hunting, all of
which contribute to the offender's transition back into law-abiding
society.
Courts cannot underestimate the significance of using the
Internet either to access job information8 2 or to perform work as
part of a job. The transition of an offender back into society aims to
reconnect him with various social institutions, most importantly the
workplace.'83 The generally disadvantaged work histories and below
average education of most felons compound the problem of success-
178. Id.
179. The latest version of Spector Pro was released in September 2006. See David LaGesse,
How To Invade Their Space, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 18, 2006, at 60 (discussing use
of Spector Pro to monitor children's online activities).
180. For product description and specifications, see Spector Pro 6.0, https://www.
spectorsoft.comlproducts/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
181. Cf. Nancy A. Ozimek, Reinstitution of the Chain Gang: A Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 753, 755 (1997) (discussing how prison work programs serve
a rehabilitative goal for inmates by creating realistic work environments and simulating the
private sector).
182. Multiple companies now use the Internet to post job openings. See, e.g., Monster,
http://www.monster.com (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (allowing users to post resumes and
search through job openings).
183. Christopher Uggen, Sara Wakefield & Bruce Western, Work and Family Perspectives
on Reentry, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 209 (Jeremy Travis & Christy
Visher eds., 2005).
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ful reintegration into society through job placement."S Studies have
shown, however, a negative correlation between offender recidivism
and placement in a job offering high-quality work.'85 Similarly, the
rehabilitative goal of supervised release is to place offenders back
into the community and also to make them a productive part of it.1
6
Prohibitions on Internet use do not serve this goal.
Severe restrictions on Internet usage, like those upheld in Paul,'87
only serve to minimize the beneficial effect of supervised release.
Instead of taking full advantage of immersion back into society,
released offenders remain sheltered and closed off from the
dramatic changes going on in the world around them.' Further-
more, they must operate at a disadvantage because they cannot
seek employment through the Internet and are limited in the type
of work that they can perform.'89 With reduced chances for employ-
ment, released offenders may not fully realize the benefits they
would otherwise receive from employment, including greater
connections to society.' 9 In addition to these particular benefits,
steady work is also linked to increased public safety and deterrence
of future crime.'
As a result, the approach of the circuits that uphold stricter
supervised restrictions'92 prohibiting Internet use minimizes these
benefits and, consequently, cannot serve the rehabilitative goals of
supervised release, or the approach of the Second Circuit. The
circuit courts of appeals that have vacated restrictions relating to
the Internet would appear to avoid these problems; in attempting to
184. Id. at 211 (stating that "convicted felons often enter prison with a history of
unemployment, low educational attainment, and few marketable job skills").
185. Id. at 213.
186. See supra Part II.
187. United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001).
188. See supra Part I.
189. Prohibiting access to websites such as Monster reduces the offender to more
traditional job sources-want ads, flyers, and the like. Lack of Internet access may also limit
offenders on supervised release from engaging in jobs that would be available had they
remained in the correctional system: for example, call center operators. See Roman Prison
Call Center Raises Ruckus, CALL CTR. MAG., Sept. 1, 2006, at 12 (noting that almost every
state runs such call centers). Such positions would require some type of Internet or e-mail
access.
190. See Uggen et al., supra note 183, at 213, 215.
191. Id. at 215.
192. See supra Part IV.B.
20071 707
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
work around the problems associated with Internet supervised
release conditions,193 however, these courts risk failing to meet the
rehabilitative goal."'
The Second Circuit recognized that a complete lack of Internet
restrictions for the offender on supervised release could potentially
result in additional imprisonment.'95 In such a circumstance,
sentencing judges might worry that a released sexual offender
would commit further crimes if not properly supervised; if appellate
courts prohibit Internet monitoring as a condition of release, the
sentencing court might instead choose to keep the offender in prison
and away from the public altogether. 96 When examining later
amendments to the supervised release statute, Congress expressed
concern that inadequate release conditions might lead "some courts
to impose a longer period of imprisonment than otherwise would be
needed to punish the violation, in order to maintain criminal justice
control since post-release supervision would not be available."'97
Commentators have noted that long periods of imprisonment may
not even serve a rehabilitative purpose; if anything, they may tend
to harden a criminal.' The Second Circuit approach explicitly
addresses the potential problem of longer prison terms by allowing
sentencing courts to impose Internet and computer use restrictions
for sexual offenders, thus minimizing the potential for judges to
193. See supra Part V.A.
194. "You fall into Scylla in seeking to avoid Charybdis." JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 181 n.2 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
195. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that "the
alternative facing Lifshitz in the absence of a computer monitoring probation condition might
well be the more extreme deprivation ... wrought by imprisonment"); see also United States
v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting same passage from Lifshitz).
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) (allowing for discretion by the district court as to the
length of the defendant's sentence based on the need to protect the public from further
criminal activity by the defendant).
197. 136 CONG. REC. 28228, 28229 (1990).
198. See Joan Petersilia, From Cell to Society: Who Is Returning Home?, in PRISONER
REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 15, 42-46 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds., 2005).
Rehabilitation does not appear to be the norm for most prisoners, as Petersilia concludes her
article by stating that offenders' "prison record[s] will have created new barriers to work,
housing, and social relationships. Now more embittered, alienated, and prone to violence than
before, many ex-convicts return to crime." Id. But see Shadd Maruna & Hans Toch, The
Impact of Imprisonment on the Desistance Process, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN
AMERICA, supra, at 139, 158-72 (discussing several successful rehabilitative initiatives within
prisons).
708 [Vol. 49:681
SUPERVISED RELEASE FOR SEX OFFENDERS
over-imprison defendants. Already steering away from the Scylla of
total prohibitions on Internet usage, the Second Circuit now avoids
the Charybdis associated with the lack of Internet restrictions
altogether.
CONCLUSION
Internet restrictions as a part of a sexual offender's term of
supervised release aim to minimize the possibility that the offender
will recommit the same type of crime that landed him in prison in
the first place. At their most extreme, however, Internet restrictions
work against the basic premise of supervised release-rehabilitation
of the offender. Appellate courts that allow absolute bans on
Internet access unintentionally prevent the offender from partici-
pating in the entirety of the community into which he is trying to
reenter. Alternatively, appellate courts that deny sentencing judges
the ability to use Internet restrictions during supervised release
risk over-imprisoning offenders to compensate for the lack of any
Internet restrictions.
The Second Circuit's approach as developed in Lifshitz and Balon
recognizes that the Internet is a critical part of the daily life of
America. This approach's look at the available technology as the
solution to the question of Internet restrictions during supervised
release allows the courts to craft release terms that maximize the
offender's potential for rehabilitation and reentry into society. The
offender can take part in all activities for which law-abiding citizens
would use the Internet, while having his access monitored or
filtered to minimize the chance of recidivism.
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